This paper develops a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences and imperfectly competitive suppliers to analyze the market and welfare effects of purity standards for non-GM food products. Analytical results show that purity standards affect the equilibrium prices and quantities of both the GM and non-GM products as well as the welfare of the groups involved. A change in purity standards is shown to create winners and losers among the consumers and the suppliers of the GM and non-GM products. Our analysis provides insights on labeling policies and the position of interest groups in countries with different adoption of, and attitudes towards genetically modified products.
Introduction
Discussions on the appropriate regulatory norms for biotech or genetically modified (GM) foods date back to the early 1980s (Cantley, 1995; OECD, 1986) . Twenty five years later, a consensus on what such norms should be remains elusive (Runge and Jackson, 2000; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004) . While the safety of GM foods prior to their commercialization is evaluated through, more or less, the same methods around the world (Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2006) , countries differ widely on their treatment of GM foods that have been deemed safe for market introduction (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; Phillips and McNeill, 2000; Gruère and Rao, 2007) . Some countries, including the United States (US) and Canada, consider these GM foods substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts and do not require segregation and labeling of these products. Others, including the European Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and China have introduced mandatory labeling regimes (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; Carter and Gruère, 2003) .
Not all mandatory labeling laws for GM foods are "created equal," however, as they differ substantially in their standards. For instance, the EU requires mandatory labeling of all food ingredients, additives and flavorings, animal feeds and feed additives as well as highly processed foods (such as refined oils) that contain more than 0.9% GM material (European Commission, 2003b) . Other countries have more liberal laws. Japan and South Korea, for instance, mandate labeling for food products that contain major ingredients with more than 5% and 2% of GM material, respectively, while they exclude animal feeds, highly processed foods, and oils from labeling requirements (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; Carter and Gruère, 2003) .
Mandatory labeling laws allow for the presence of GM material in non-GM food to cope with perfect segregation and purity of non-GM food being costly and often not practically feasible. Purity standards are typically set up in terms of tolerances or purity thresholds defining the amount of GM material that triggers labeling of a product as "GM." Since the GM content allowed in non-GM food is generally meant to be "accidental and unavoidable," these purity thresholds are often referred to as "adventitious presence," or AP thresholds.1
While most mandatory labeling regimes include AP thresholds, the establishment of these thresholds has, generally, been an arduous process. Consider the EU experience, for instance. Even though the EU introduced mandatory labeling for GMOs (European Union, 1990 ) and food derived from GMOs in 1997 (European Union, 1997) , it took two more years to set the purity threshold at 1%. Then, in 2001, the EU Commission adopted two new legislative proposals (European Union, 2001 ) that sought to extend mandatory labeling to animal feeds and feed additives as well as highly refined oils, sugars and starches. Purity thresholds were revisited and, after two years of contentious deliberation, they were set at their current level of 0.9% (European Union, 2003b) . 2 Since that time, EU regulators have sought to put the last piece of their GM regulatory framework in place by establishing purity thresholds for conventional planting seeds. Once again, the process has been highly contentious with some interest groups calling for thresholds set at the level of detectability, typically 0.1%, and others advocating higher thresholds that would presumably minimize disruptions in the agri-food supply chain, typically 0.5% or more (Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier, 2004) . The EU Commission has attempted to find the "middle ground" -discussing thresholds between 0.3% and 0.5% (Devos et al., 2009 ) -with little success.
Although the differences in these purity standards seem minute, they have caused strong disagreements. While the underlying causes of discord seem to be rooted, at least in part, in trade and political considerations (Gruère et al., 2009; Vigani et al., 2009) , little is known about the market and welfare implications of different purity thresholds. What recent research has shown is that purity thresholds impact the production and segregation costs in non-GM supply channels (Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier, 2004; EU Commission, 2006) as well as the consumer valuation of GM and non-GM foods (Noussair et al., 2004; Rousu et al., 2005) .
The objective of this study is to analyze the market and welfare effects of purity thresholds for non-GM foods subject to such thresholds. In particular, our analysis focuses on the effect of allowing the presence of GM material in non-GM foods on the prices and quantities of the GM and non-GM products, the profits of the product suppliers, and consumer welfare. To our knowledge, these market and welfare effects of different regulatory standards in biotech labeling laws have received little attention in the economic literature.
Indeed, the only other study dealing with the welfare effects of purity standards for non-GM food is by Lapan and Moschini (2007) . A key difference between our study and Lapan and Moschini (2007) lies on the treatment of the firms facilitating the movement of products from farmers to consumers. Specifically, while we explicitly account for the existence of market power in the supply channels of the GM and non-GM products, Lapan and Moschini (2007) assume a perfectly competitive marketing sector that handles both GM and non-GM products. Explicitly accounting for the market power of GM and non-GM product suppliers enables us to capture the effect of purity standards for non-GM products on (i) the price of GM products (see footnote 20 below) and (ii) the profits of GM and non-GM product suppliers that are not captured in Lapan and Moschini (2007) . In fact, virtually none of the main results of our paper (i.e., effect of purity standards on GM prices, quantities of GM and non-GM products, supplier profits, and consumers of GM and non-GM products) appear in Lapan and Moschini (2007) . In addition to accounting for imperfectly competitive suppliers of GM and non-GM products, our study explicitly accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences towards GM and non-GM foods expressed in numerous, stated and revealed, consumer preference studies around the world (Lusk et al., 2005) ; cost differences in the supply of GM and non-GM foods; as well as differences in the structure of the two markets. Heterogeneity in consumer preferences and costs are key components of our model and critical in understanding the coexistence of GM and non-GM foods when labeling occurs. The effects of purity thresholds in markets characterized by the absence of GM products are also considered and analyzed within this framework. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the determination of purity standards for various food products and highlight the differences in the establishment of such standards for non-GM food. In section 3, we analyze consumer purchasing decisions and welfare and determine the equilibrium prices and quantities under a benchmark case where GM and non-GM products co-exist in the market and no GM material is allowable in non-GM food. In sections 4 and 5, we examine the effects of regulatory allowances for the presence of GM material in non-GM food on equilibrium quantities and prices, supplier profits, and consumer welfare. Section 6 considers the case where purity thresholds change in markets characterized by the absence of GM products, while the final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
Purity Standards in Food Labeling
As mentioned previously, purity standards for non-GM food have been a regulatory response to the recognition that perfect segregation and purity of non-GM food is costly and, quite often, practically impossible (e.g., European Union, 2000; Food Standards New Zealand Australia, 2003) . Indeed, separation of GM and non-GM crops usually occurs within commodity systems that have been built for scale and efficiency and are, generally, not well equipped to perfectly segregate crops. In this context, mandatory labeling laws make allowances for the presence of GM ingredients in non-GM food caused by unintended admixtures occurring along the agri-food supply chain -from seed breeding, to agricultural production, harvest, transport, storage, and processing. In all cases, a key question has been just how much GM content should be allowed in non-GM food? That is, what should the purity or AP threshold be? In answering this question, standard technical methods for setting thresholds do not apply.
Purity thresholds for various substances are widespread around the world and across the agri-food supply chain. For instance, there are thresholds for the maximum content of A&D vitamins in fortified milk; caffeine and quinine content in drinks and other foodstuffs; the maximum content of constituents (e.g., fluorides) in natural water; the maximum amounts of sweeteners (e.g., sucralose, aspartame) in desserts, confectionary, and other foodstuffs; the maximum levels of additives (e.g., citric and lactic acids) and preservatives (e.g., sorbic acid) in various foodstuffs; the maximum levels of common food allergens (e.g., peanuts, soybeans, crustaceans, eggs, and nuts) and certain byproducts (e.g., wheat gluten and starch derivatives) in various prepared foodstuffs; the maximum allowable levels of contaminants (e.g., nitrates, mycotoxins, aflotoxins, dioxins, heavy metals); and the maximum allowable pesticide residues in foods (see, for instance, European Union (1989 Union ( , 1995a Union ( , 1995b Union ( , 1996 Union ( , 2003a ). All such thresholds define the amounts of substances that trigger some policy action -from mandatory labeling to product recall. And in all cases, these thresholds relate to some identified food safety risk.
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Along these lines, most purity thresholds are decided through a rather standardized and highly technical risk assessment process. Risk is usually defined by determining the typical levels of intake of a given substance and the probable levels where adverse effects occur. A margin of safety is then added to account for uncertainty while setting specific thresholds. Other technical factors (such as "best manufacturing practices") are also considered to account for current and anticipated technical capabilities that are necessary to implement the specified thresholds and testing technology that might be necessary to enforce them.
While potential health and environmental safety risks from GMOs and GM foods have been at the epicenter of the debate on GMOs (NRC, 2000; ILSI, 2004) , it is important to emphasize that mandatory labeling applies only to GM foods that have been reviewed and found to be "as safe as their conventional counterparts." 6 In this context, standard technical risk assessment-based methods provide no guidance since GM purity thresholds cannot be linked to specific food safety risks.
So, how are purity thresholds set for non-GM foods? While regulatory and legislative intent are not always explicit, there are exceptions that provide some useful insights. For instance, Article 8 of Regulation 49/2000 that established the initial 1% purity threshold for the EU's GM labeling regime states that: "The value of 1% best serves the purpose of establishing a tolerance level which simultaneously remains low and takes into account the necessary feasibility along the production chain. Detection methods already provide, or shortly will, the necessary tools to implement this value." Hence, AP thresholds seem to be affected by the technical feasibility of segregating non-GM from GM foods.
7
To the extent that AP thresholds affect the equilibrium conditions in the markets for GM and non-GM food products, one would expect them to also be affected by the political influence of the interest groups involved.
In this study, we seek to determine the effect of AP thresholds on the equilibrium prices and quantities of GM and non-GM products, supplier profits, and consumer welfare. We begin by analyzing a benchmark case of 0% AP threshold and proceed to determine the effects of changing thresholds from zero GM content up under different cost and market structures and heterogeneous consumer preferences for GM and non-GM food products. 6 For instance, the EU Commission has issued the following announcement after each individual GMO regulatory approval: "The (occasional GMO) has been subject to a rigorous pre-market risk assessment. It has been scientifically assessed by the European Food Safety Authority as being as safe as any conventional (counterpart conventional organism). Its safety is, therefore, not in question, and neither is the question of user or consumer choice." It has been suggested, however, that countries could, strategically, consider GM foods as safe so that their labeling of these products would be listed as a technical barrier to trade (TBT) and not as a sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measure (which would be more difficult to defend in a dispute at the World Trade Organization) (Gruère and Rao, 2007; Marchant, et al., 2010) . 7 It is important to note that establishing the threshold at the limit of technical feasibility does not imply that all enforcement issues are being addressed -major technical and scientific challenges still need to be answered regarding sampling strategies and molecular analytical procedures (Weighardt, 2006) . As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, enforcement issues also arise for ingredients that represent only a fraction of the whole food product or when no traces of DNA can be identified for food products that have been highly processed (e.g. vegetable oils).
Baseline Case: Non-GM Products are Free of GM Ingredients

3.1.Consumer Characteristics and Behavior
To capture the varying consumer aversion to GM products reflected in numerous stated and revealed preference studies in Europe and elsewhere (Lusk et al., 2005) , 8 we follow Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and model GM and non-GM products as vertically differentiated goods. Specifically, we assume that the two products are uniformly quality ranked by consumers (i.e., if offered at the same price all consumers would prefer the non-GM product), but consumers differ in their valuation of the perceived quality differences (and, thus, they differ in their willingness-to-pay for such quality differences). To reflect the producer orientation of the first-generation of GM innovations, the GM and non-GM products considered in this study share the same observable physical characteristics (e.g., appearance, taste etc.) while differing in the presence (or absence) of credence GM material.
Assuming that a consumer spends a small fraction of total expenditures on the goods in question, her utility function can be written as:
if a unit of a substitute product is consumed where gm U is the utility associated with consuming one unit of the GM product, ngm U is the utility associated with consuming one unit of the non-GM version of the product, and s U is the utility associated with the unit consumption of a substitute product. In essence, s U represents a reservation level of utility which, for simplicity and tractability, is assumed to equal a base level of utility U. The price of the GM product is gm p , the price of its non-GM counterpart is ngm p , and the parameters  and  are utility enhancement factors associated with the consumption of the GM and the non-GM products, respectively. The 8 Consumer aversion to GM products may be based on health, environmental, ethical and/or philosophical concerns about agricultural biotechnology and affects the consumer valuation of GM products. 9 Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004) analyze the market and welfare effects of the introduction of GM products into the food system and do not consider the issue of purity standards in biotech labeling laws. On the relationship between the Giannakas & Fulton framework and the classic models of vertical product differentiation by Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Thisse (1979, 1980) , and Sutton (1982, 1983) , see Giannakas (2011). characteristic  differs according to consumer and captures heterogeneous consumer preferences for GM and non-GM products. For simplicity of exposition, the characteristic  takes values between zero and one and consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed between the polar values of .
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In this context, the terms  and  give the difference in utility from consuming the GM product and the non-GM product, respectively.
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To capture the stated consumer aversion to GM products,  is assumed smaller than  with the difference (-) reflecting the divergence in consumer valuation of the perceived quality differences between the two products. Put in a different way, (-) captures the level of aversion to GM products of the consumer with differentiating attribute . Finally, to allow for positive market shares of the two vertically differentiated products, we assume that the GM product is priced below its non-GM counterpart with the price difference being less than the level of aversion to GM products for all consumers (i.e., (4) and (5) 
below).
This assumption is relaxed later in the paper to analyze the effect of purity standards in markets characterized by the absence of GM products. The consumption choice of an individual consumer is determined by the relationship between the utilities derived from the different products. More specifically, the consumer with differentiating attribute:
( 2) is indifferent between consuming a unit of GM and non-GM product -the utility associated with the consumption of these products is the same. Similarly, the consumer with differentiating characteristic:
is indifferent between consuming a unit of the GM product and a unit of the substitute. Consumers with high aversion to genetic modification (i.e., consumers 10 The qualitative implications of relaxing this assumption to allow a concentration of consumers at the ends of the spectrum (i.e., zero and one) are straightforward and are discussed throughout the text. 11 In this setting, U+ and U+ represent the consumer willingness-to-pay (wtp) for a unit of the GM and the non-GM product, respectively. Subtracting the relevant equilibrium prices from these wtp values provides an estimate of the surplus associated with the consumption of these products for the consumer with differentiating attribute . 
From equations (4) and (5) follows that the demand for the GM (non-GM) product falls with an increase in its price and/or an increase (decrease) in consumer aversion to GM products, 12 and rises as the price of the non-GM (GM) product increases. If gm p were greater than ngm p , the GM product would be driven out of the market, while if the price premium of the non-GM product, ngm p -gm p , exceeded the difference -, the GM product would dominate the market. and s U utility curves and depicts the consumption decisions under a labeling regime when the non-GM product is free of GM ingredients and all products (i.e., GM, non-GM and substitute products) enjoy positive market shares. Aggregate consumer surplus is given by the area underneath the effective utility curve shown by the kinked dashed line in Figure 1 and equals Figure 1 . Consumption decisions when non-GM products are free of GM material
Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
Consider now the equilibrium conditions in the markets for the GM and non-GM products. Figure 2 graphs the inverse demand curves for the GM and the non-GM products (shown as gm D and ngm D , respectively) and depicts the equilibrium conditions in the two markets in the familiar price-quantity space.
Figure 2. Equilibrium conditions when non-GM products are free of GM material
The inverse demand curves for the two products are derived from equations (4) and (5) and are given by:
while the equilibrium prices and quantities can be expressed as:
13 Detailed derivations for equations (8)- (11) and the rest of the analysis are provided in the Appendix.
where gm  and ngm  are conjectural variation elasticities capturing the degree of market power in the retail markets for the GM and the non-GM products, respectively, 14 and gm c and ngm c are the marginal costs faced by the retailers of these products. The retail costs of the GM and the non-GM products reflect (i) the production, processing, and marketing costs along the two supply channels, (ii) the costs associated with labeling and the segregation of the two products
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(with the majority of these costs being incurred in the non-GM supply chain), and (iii) the market power at previous stages of the supply chain (i.e., the market power of input suppliers, food manufacturers, wholesalers etc.). The greater are the production, processing and/or marketing costs, and/or the greater are the labeling and segregation costs, and/or the greater is the market power upstream a supply channel, the greater are the retail costs of a product. 16 It should be pointed out that, since the prices of the GM and non-GM products are strategic complements (i.e., a change in the price of a product causes the price of its substitute to change in the same direction; see equations (6) and (7)), an increase in either the market power or the retail costs in a market causes the prices of both the GM and non-GM products to rise, i.e.,
with i, j{gm, ngm} and i ≠ j. While increased market power and retail costs in the GM (non-GM) market cause both 14 The  parameters take values between zero and one and capture the degree of retailers' market power -the greater are the s, the greater is the market power in the retail markets for the GM and non-GM products. A value of  equal to 1 corresponds to a monopoly while a value of  equal to 0 reflects a perfectly competitive retail market structure (Perloff, Karp and Golan, 2007) . 15 Our analysis considers the case where mandatory labeling separates GM and non-GM products and applies equally well to labeling regimes requiring only one or both products to be labeled (since, when only one of the products is required to be labeled, the unlabeled product is, obviously, "the other"). 16 Handling both GM and non-GM production in the same processing plants may entail switching costs in terms of downtimes and labor costs to clean the equipment and prevent admixtures before a non-GM production batch is processed. In our analysis, such switching costs are subsumed in the cost of segregation. Some processors, however, may decide to build new plants so that the GM and the non-GM processes can be handled separately. The cost of building new plants is, normally, sunk and may affect the structure of the processing sector. On the effects of the cost structure and market power upstream a supply channel on the cost of downstream firms see Waterson (1984) . gm p and ngm p to rise, they increase the price of the GM (non-GM) product by more, i.e.,
. Consequently, the greater is the retailer power in a market and/or the greater are the retail costs of a product, the lower is the equilibrium quantity of this product and the greater is the equilibrium quantity of its substitute, i.e.,
Market Effects of Increased AP Thresholds for Non-GM Food Products
Cost and Utility Effects of Increased AP Thresholds
Consider now the case where the non-GM food product is allowed to contain up to a certain "adventitious" amount of GM material. This increase in the AP threshold for non-GM products affects their costs as well as the utility associated with their consumption.
In particular, an increase in the AP threshold reduces the cost of producing and segregating the non-GM product and, thus, it reduces ngm c . Under conditions of coexistence, accidental admixtures between the GM and non-GM supply chains are almost inevitable. Under zero or near zero AP thresholds, significant and costly changes in the seed breeding, agricultural production, harvest, transport, storage and processing practices are necessary (Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier, 2004; Huygen et al., 2004; EU Commission, 2006) .
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Increasing AP thresholds, makes some of these changes in the non-GM supply chain unnecessary, limits product rejections and related liabilities and, ultimately, reduces the cost of non-GM food.
18 17 Adjustments in current "best practices" are necessary at every part of the agri-food supply chain to meet strict AP thresholds under conditions of coexistence. In seed and crop production, increasing isolation distances as well as the use of time isolation and border rows are some of the methods employed to minimize admixtures from pollen flow in the field. Prolonged and detail cleaning and use of dedicated storage and processing facilities, as well as modified delivery and processing scheduling are some of the methods employed in transport, storage and manufacturing to minimize commingling and other accidental admixtures. The implied costs of such adjustments vary across regions and among the different parts of the supply chain (Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2001) . 18 Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier (2004) show that at very low AP thresholds cost reductions due to a reduction in purity standards can be significant. As AP thresholds become larger, cost reductions from additional increases in AP become smaller and, eventually, nil.
The cost effect of an increase in the AP threshold is given by:
where ' ngm c is the retail cost of the non-GM product ex post (i.e., after the increase in the AP threshold). The greater is the amount of GM material allowed in the non-GM product (i.e., the higher the AP threshold), the lower is ' ngm c , and the greater is .
In addition to reducing ngm c , an increase in AP thresholds reduces the utility associated with the consumption of the non-GM good as the latter is now allowed to contain a certain amount of GM material. The greater a consumer's aversion to GM products, the greater the reduction in utility caused by the threshold increase. Auction experiments in the US and France showed that consumer willingness-to-pay for certain non-GM foods decreased between 7% and 20% when AP thresholds changed from 0% to 1% (see Rousu et al. (2005) , and Noussair et al. (2004) ).
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The utility effect of an increase in the AP threshold is given by:
where '  is the utility enhancement factor associated with the consumption of the non-GM product with reduced purity. The greater is the allowable GM content in non-GM food, the smaller is the difference in utility associated with the consumption of GM and non-GM products, the smaller is '  , and the greater is . The equilibrium conditions under reduced purity can be derived by substituting ' ngm c and '  for ngm c and , respectively, in equations (8)- (11) and can be written as: 19 As AP thresholds become larger, utility discounts from additional increases in AP become smaller and, eventually, become nil. 
The Effect of Increased AP Thresholds on Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
The reduced costs in the non-GM supply channel (cost effect) and the reduced consumer willingness-to-pay for the non-GM product (utility effect) cause the equilibrium price of this product to fall after the increase in the AP threshold, i.e.,
While the increased AP threshold causes the price of the non-GM product to fall under all market conditions, its effect on the quantity of the non-GM product depends on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects as well as on the level of consumer aversion to GM products, the retailer market power, and the retail costs of the two products prior to the threshold increase. Ceteris paribus, the greater (smaller) the reduction in the cost of the non-GM product and/or the lower (greater) the reduction in the consumer valuation of the non-GM product, the greater the likelihood that the increase in the AP threshold will cause the equilibrium quantity of the non-GM product to increase (fall). Comparing equations (11) and (17) shows (see Appendix) that when the cost effect of the increased AP threshold exceeds a critical value Due to the demand links between the GM and non-GM products, the changes in the costs of, and consumer willingness-to-pay for the non-GM product have also an impact on the equilibrium conditions in the GM product market. In particular, the reduction in the price of the non-GM product due to an increase in the AP threshold (equation (18)) reduces the intercept of the consumer demand for the GM product while the reduction in the consumer valuation of the non-GM product increases (both the intercept and slope of) the demand for the GM product (see equation (6)). Obviously, the total effect of the increased AP threshold on the demand for the GM product depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects. Since the reduction in the price of the non-GM product increases with an increase in the cost effect of the increased AP threshold, and since the reduction in consumer valuation of the non-GM product increases with an increase in the utility effect, the smaller the cost effect and/or the greater the utility effect, the greater the likelihood that the increase in the AP threshold will result in increased demand for the GM product. As the increase in AP thresholds has no effect on the costs of the GM product, an increase in the demand for the GM product increases the equilibrium quantity of this product and may also increase the price of the GM product.
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Formally, comparing equations (10) and (16) shows that when the cost effect of the increased AP threshold is less (greater) than a critical value Finally, comparing equations (8) and (14) reveals that if the utility effect of increased AP thresholds dominates the cost effect so that  falls below the critical value (see Appendix), our analysis indicates that, depending on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the level of consumer aversion to GM products, the retailer market power, and the retail costs of the two products prior to the AP threshold increase, there are four possible scenarios on the market effects of reduced purity standards for non-GM food. ).
Graphically, the increase in the AP threshold for the non-GM product causes a downward shift of the marginal cost curve in the non-GM market (cost effect), a reduction in both the intercept of the demand for the non-GM product and the absolute value of the slopes of the demand curves in the GM and the non-GM product markets (utility effect), and a change in the intercept of the demand for the GM product. Figures 3 and 4 depict the equilibrium quantities and prices in the two markets under the different scenarios considered here. The solid and dashed lines show, respectively, the demand and cost relationships before and after the threshold increase. The dotted and hatched areas in these Figures illustrate the relevant gains and losses by suppliers as the purity of the non-GM product decreases.
The market effects from an increase in the AP threshold can also be shown in the consumer utility space depicted in Figure 1 . In this setting, the reduced ngm p and  increase the intercept and reduce the slope of the ngm U utility curve, while a reduced (increased) gm p causes an upward (downward) shift of the gm U utility curve. Figure 5 illustrates the case where an increase in the AP threshold reduces the product prices, increases ngm x and reduces gm x (Scenario I). Figures 6, 7 and 8 illustrate Scenarios II, III and IV, respectively. Our main results on the market effects of increased AP thresholds can be summarized as follows:
RESULT 1: An increase in the AP threshold for non-GM food reduces the price of non-GM products.
RESULT 2: The effect of an increase in the AP threshold for non-GM food on the price of GM products and the quantities of the GM and non-GM products depends on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the level of consumer aversion to GM products, retailer market power, and the retail costs of the two products. Ceteris paribus, the smaller (greater) the cost reduction in the non-GM supply channel and/or the greater (smaller) the reduction in the utility associated with the consumption of the non-GM product after the threshold increase, the greater the likelihood that this threshold increase will reduce (increase) the equilibrium quantity of the non-GM product and will increase (reduce) the quantity and price of its GM counterpart. 
Welfare Effects of Increased AP Thresholds for Non-GM Food Products
The Effect of Increased AP Thresholds on Supplier Profits
As mentioned previously, the gains and losses of suppliers of non-GM and GM products due to increased AP thresholds are depicted by the dotted and hatched areas in Figures 3 and 4 . Mathematically, the profits of non-GM and GM product suppliers prior to the threshold increase are given by: (23) while the profits of these same suppliers after the reduction in purity standards are: Comparing the profits of the product suppliers before and after the increase in the AP threshold shows that the effect of such an increase on supplier profits depends on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the level of consumer aversion to GM products, the retailer market power, and the initial costs ngm c and gm c . In particular, comparing equations (22) and (24) shows that when the cost effect of the increased AP threshold, , is smaller (greater) than a critical value given by 
Similarly, a comparison of equations (23) and (25) reveals that when the cost effect of increased AP threshold  is greater (smaller) than a critical value the profits of GM product suppliers fall (increase) as the AP threshold increases, i.e.,
The reasoning is as follows. The greater is  and/or the lower is σ, the greater the likelihood that gm p and gm x will fall and ngm x will increase after an increase in the AP threshold (see Result 2). Since the reduction in purity standards causes ngm p to fall (see Result 1), the greater the likelihood that s (where i{gm, ngm}) will fall (increase), the greater the likelihood that i  will be reduced (increased) after an AP threshold increase. In this context, GM product suppliers will always lose under Scenario I (where both gm x and gm p fall after a reduction in purity standards), while non-GM producers will always lose under Scenarios III and IV (where ngm x decreases after an increase in the AP threshold). These losses incurred by the suppliers of the two products are illustrated in Figure 3 , panel b, and Figure 4 , panel a.
RESULT 3: The effect of an increase in the AP threshold for non-GM food on the suppliers of the non-GM and GM products depends on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the level of consumer aversion to GM products, the market power of the product suppliers, and the initial retail costs of the two products. Ceteris paribus, the smaller (greater) the cost savings in the non-GM supply channel and/or the greater (smaller) the reduction in consumer valuation of the non-GM product, the greater the likelihood that increased AP thresholds will result in losses for the suppliers of the non-GM (GM) product. 
relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects. For given cost and utility effects, the smaller (greater) the consumer aversion to GM products, the smaller (greater) the welfare losses, and the greater (smaller) the likelihood that the reduced product prices will result in consumer welfare gains. When the cost effect is relatively large (small) and/or when the utility effect is relatively small (large), an increase in the purity threshold results in welfare gains (losses) for all consumers.
Variation of the Model: The Effects of Purity Standards in the Absence of GM Products
The previous analysis has focused on the general case where the purity standards are reduced in a market where GM products co-exist with their non-GM counterparts. Some markets with a mandatory labeling regime, however, are characterized by the absence of GM products. This part of the paper considers the effects of increased AP thresholds for non-GM products when GM products are not in the market prior to the threshold change. Graphically, this case can be depicted as having the U gm curve lying underneath the U ngm or/and the U s curves  (i.e., for all consumers). It turns out that the results are fairly consistent with those in the case of coexistence of GM and non-GM products derived earlier.
Specifically, similar to the case of coexistence, an increase in the AP threshold will have cost and utility effects in the market of the non-GM productit will reduce both the costs of identity preserving the non-GM products and the utility associated with the consumption of these products. The reduction in the cost and consumer valuation of non-GM products will reduce their price, p ngm , and, depending on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, it will decrease or increase the equilibrium quantity x ngm , the retailer profits  ngm , and the welfare of consumers of these products. In general, the smaller the cost effect and/or the greater the utility effect of the increase in the AP threshold, the greater the likelihood that this increase will reduce x ngm and  ngm and will result in losses in consumer welfare.
Unlike the case of coexistence, the increased AP thresholds in the absence of GM products might not have an effect in the market for these products, however. In particular, if the cost effect of increased threshold outweighed the utility effect (so that x ngm increased after the threshold increase), GM products would be kept out of the market. For the GM products to enter the market, the utility effect of the threshold increase should dominate the cost effect and result in gm ngm p p ' being greater than  ' . In such a case, the U gm curve would lie above the U ngm and U s curves over some range of  (i.e., for some consumers) and the equilibrium p gm , x gm and  gm would be given by equations (14), (16) and (25), respectively.
RESULT 6: An increase in the AP threshold for non-GM products when GM products are not in the market prior to the threshold change can result in the entry of GM products in this market. The greater the utility effect and/or the smaller the cost effect of the threshold increase, the greater the likelihood that GM products will enter the market after the AP threshold increase.
Before concluding this part it is important to note that, due to the absence of GM products from the market, it is reasonable to expect that the utility effect would dominate the cost effect of increased AP thresholds since the savings in the costs of segregating the non-GM products would (in the absence of their GM counterparts) be modest, while the consumer aversion to GM products could be significant (explaining, at least in part, the absence of GM products from the market
22
). To the extent that the utility effect dominates the cost effect in the absence of GM products, the increase in AP thresholds can be expected to reduce p ngm and x ngm , make non-GM suppliers and consumers worse off, and result in the entry of GM products in the market.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences to analyze the market and welfare effects of alternative purity thresholds for non-GM food products. An increase in AP thresholds has been shown to affect both the supply and the demand sides of the market by reducing the production and segregation costs in the non-GM supply chain as well as the consumer valuation of non-GM food.
Our analysis shows that these cost and utility effects reduce the price of non-GM products and have an effect on the equilibrium price of GM products, the quantities of GM and non-GM products, and the welfare of the groups involved. The market and welfare effects of increased AP thresholds are shown to be casespecific and dependent on the relative magnitude of the associated cost and utility effects; the distribution of consumer preferences and the level of aversion to GM products; the production, processing, and marketing costs along the GM and non-GM supply chains; the segregation and labeling costs of the two products; and the market power present in the supply channels of the GM and non-GM products. It is important to note that an "as low as technically possible" threshold does not necessarily correspond to maximum consumer welfare. In fact, our analysis suggests that, under certain circumstances (i.e., high cost effect and/or low utility effect), it is possible to improve the welfare of all GM and non-GM product consumers through a more liberal AP threshold for non-GM foods.
In addition to identifying the effect of purity standards on prices, quantities, and the welfare of the groups involved, our analysis shows that a change in the AP threshold can create winners and losers not only among the consumers but also among the suppliers of the two products. The identity of these winners and losers is determined by the relative cost and utility effects. For instance, while an increase in the AP threshold under a low cost effect and a high utility effect results in benefits for suppliers of GM products and losses for consumers of GM and non-GM products and suppliers of non-GM products, the same reduction under a high cost effect and a low utility effect has the exact opposite outcome for the interest groups involved.
These results have important implications for policy design and the political economy of AP thresholds. The existence of nonlinearities in the cost and utility effects of purity thresholds (similar to those identified in Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier (2004) , Noussair et al. (2004) , and Rousu et al. (2005) ) imply that, at low AP thresholds, even small changes in these thresholds could have large welfare and distributional effects. Our results can then help explain the strong disagreements that have been observed in EU negotiations for seemingly minute shifts in AP thresholds.
In general, potential winners and losers from regulatory changes in AP thresholds should be expected to politically position themselves in order to serve their interests. Our analysis can be utilized to provide insights on the position of the different groups in negotiations about AP thresholds and the political economy of setting these thresholds. A key finding of our analysis is that the very same group could either support or oppose an increase in AP thresholds depending on the particular market conditions (that determine whether such increase would lead to gains or losses). Our results can, therefore, provide some rationalization of seemingly "irrational" behaviors in the marketplace.
Consider the organic markets in the EU and the US, for instance. Until recently, EU regulations prohibited the presence of GM material in organic products requiring these products to be GM free. With low segregation costs (due to a negligible domestic GM production) and high expressed consumer aversion to GM foods, our analysis suggests that European consumers and producers of organic products should have no interest in increased AP thresholds. 23 The low segregation costs and the high European consumer aversion to GM products suggest that the utility effect of increased AP thresholds dominates the cost effect in the EU (i.e., EU falls under either Scenario III or Scenario IV of our study). In such a case, our analysis reveals that an increased AP threshold results in losses for the consumers and producers of non-GM products (see Results 3 and 5).
(European Union, 2007) allowing products with up to 0.9% GM content to be labeled as "organic," while intending "to reduce the segregation and identity preservation costs incurred by the organic sector," resulted in an outcry by the organic industry (Herald News Daily, 2006) . 24 Conversely, with relatively higher production and segregation costs (due to a widespread adoption of GM crops and a significant domestic GM production) and considerably lower consumer aversion to GM products, the cost effect of increased AP thresholds should dominate the utility effect in the US (i.e., the US should fall under Scenario I of our study). Our analysis then indicates that, unlike their European counterparts, American consumers and organic producers should not favor a zero AP threshold policy. The position of the Organic Trade Association, which is a membership-based business association for the organic industry in North America, reads as follow: "OTA rejects a zero-tolerance policy at this time, on the grounds that obtaining a zero level of GMOs may not be possible in the US due to widespread contamination." In fact, "OTA does not support setting any tolerance level" as "organic production is a process guarantee" which is consistent with the current US policy on organics (Organic Trade Association, 2009).
In closing, it is important to re-iterate the significance of purity thresholds in labeling and coexistence of GM and non-GM foods. Purity thresholds define what a "non-GM" food is; they influence its costs of production, segregation and distribution; they impact consumer willingness-to-pay for non-GM foods; they influence the share of GM and non-GM foods in the market place; and they ultimately affect prices and welfare. Given the prevalence and importance of purity thresholds, it is surprising how little research exists on their market and welfare effects. Our study makes some progress in this direction and provides useful insights for understanding the behavior of stakeholder groups in policy negotiations.
Our results also point to particular directions where additional research is needed. Since the market and welfare effects of purity thresholds have been shown to depend on the relative magnitude of their cost and utility effects, reliable estimates of these cost and utility effects would be of paramount significance for the interest groups involved. They are also essential for the design of a solid economic policy on GM food labeling standards.
Substituting the expressions in equations (A5) and (A6) into equations (A1) and (A2), we obtain the equilibrium quantities as a function of the exogenous parameters:
A2. Comparative Statics on the Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
From (A5), we get:
The denominator of (A9) is positive because it is a square. The numerator of (A9) is also positive because the bracketed expression is equal to the numerator of (A7) (which needs to be positive for gm x > 0). Therefore,
From (A6), we get:
The denominator of (A11) is positive because it is a square. The numerator of (A11) is also positive because the bracketed expression is equal to the numerator of (A8) (which needs to be positive for ngm x > 0). Therefore,
The denominator of (A13) is positive because it is a square. The numerator of (A13) is also positive because the bracketed expression is equal to the numerator of (A8) (which needs to be positive for ngm x > 0). Therefore,
The denominator of (A15) is positive because it is a square. The numerator of (A15) is also positive because the bracketed expression is equal to the numerator of (A7) (which needs to be positive for gm x > 0). Therefore,
which is positive, i.e., 
which is positive, i.e.,
Subtracting (A15) from (A9), we get:
The denominator of (A25) is positive because it is square. The numerator of (A25) is also positive because it is equal to the numerator of (A7) (which needs to be positive for gm x > 0). Therefore, 0
Subtracting (A13) from (A11), we get:
The denominator of (A27) is positive because it is a square. The numerator of (A27) is also positive because the bracketed expression equals to the numerator of (A8) (which needs to be positive for ngm x > 0). Therefore,
which is negative, i.e.,
and *
which is also negative as long as ngm x > 0, i.e.,
Consequently, the cost and utility effects of increased AP thresholds cause p ngm to fall, i.e., 
Visual inspection reveals that the numerator of (A44) is positive. The denominator of (A44) is also positive because it is equal to the denominator of (A36) (which needs to be positive for 
Visual inspection reveals that the numerator of (A48) is negative. The denominator of (A48) is positive because it is equal to the denominator of (A35) (which needs to be positive for 
Visual inspection reveals that the numerator of (A52) is negative. The denominator of (A52) is positive because it is equal to the denominator of (A35) (which needs to be positive for 0  ' gm x ). As a result, 0 which implies that ′ 0 ⇔ * * * (A53)
A4. Ranking of the Critical Values
The relationship between the critical values * , * * and * * * (and the associated scenarios considered in the analysis) is depicted in the figure below.
In particular, taking the difference between * * and * we get the expression:
The expression in (A54) is positive as the bracketed expressions of the numerator and the denominator are, respectively, equal to the numerator and the denominator of in equation (A7). Visual inspection also reveals that the second part of the numerator and the rest of the denominator in (A54) are positive. As a result * * * 0 holds always. Similarly, the difference between * and * * * is given by:
and is also positive as the bracketed expressions of the numerator and the denominator are, respectively, equal to the numerator and the denominator of in equation (A7). Visual inspection also reveals that the second part of the numerator and the rest of the denominator in (A55) are positive. As a result * * * * 0 holds always.
A5. The Effect of Increased AP Thresholds on Supplier Profits
The profits of the GM and non-GM product suppliers before and after the AP threshold increase are given by equations (22)- (25) in the text.
a. The Effect of Increased AP Thresholds on Non-GM Supplier Profits
Subtracting (22) from (24), we get an expression of the form Note that all the terms in (A62) are squared expressions except for the first parts of the numerator and the denominator which are positive. As a result 4 0 and real solutions exist.
To identify the proper solution, we set 0 and keep the solution for which  is equal to 0 (when 0, the value of that would keep the profits of the producer constant is the one for which 0 . This solution corresponds to the one depicted in (A61), i.e.,
√ (A63)
To determine the sign of the difference Π′ Π when is compared to , we need to determine the sign of the derivative of (A56) at .
(A64)
Substituting (A62) in (A63), we find that for
Since the root is positive, the derivative of the profit difference is increasing at . Thus, 
Note that all the terms in (A62) are squared expressions except for the first parts of the numerator and the denominator which are positive. As a result 4 0 and real solutions exist.
To identify the proper solution, we set 0 and keep the solution for which  is equal to 0 (when 0, the value of that would keep the profits of the producer constant is the one for which 0 . This solution corresponds to the one depicted in (A70), i.e.,
√ (A74)
To determine the sign of the difference Π′ Π when is compared to , we need to determine the sign of the derivative of (A66) at .
(A75)
Substituting (A72) in (A73), we find that for
Since the root is positive, the derivative of the profit difference is decreasing at . As a result ⇒ Π′ Π 0 (A77)
A6. Critical Value of w in Equation (28)
To obtain the first part of the set in equation (28) (i.e., ), we equate the utility for the non-GM product in equation (1) with the utility for the non-GM product after the increase in the AP threshold and solve for . The second part of the set (i.e., ), is obtained by equating the utility for the non-GM product in (1) with the utility for the GM product after the threshold increase and solving for .
A7. Condition for GM Products to Enter the Market After a Threshold Increase
The expression for the quantity of the GM product after the threshold increase is (A78)
From (A78) follows that 0 ⟺ (A79)
